Supabase Audit Auth Users
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
by yoanbernabeu Β· MIT
The skill
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities through various authentication endpoints.
User Enumeration Audit
π΄ CRITICAL: PROGRESSIVE FILE UPDATES REQUIRED
You MUST write to context files AS YOU GO, not just at the end.
- Write to
.sb-pentest-context.jsonIMMEDIATELY after each endpoint tested- Log to
.sb-pentest-audit.logBEFORE and AFTER each test- DO NOT wait until the skill completes to update files
- If the skill crashes or is interrupted, all prior findings must already be saved
This is not optional. Failure to write progressively is a critical error.
This skill tests for user enumeration vulnerabilities in authentication flows.
When to Use This Skill
- To check if user existence can be detected
- To test login, signup, and recovery flows for information leakage
- As part of authentication security audit
- Before production deployment
Prerequisites
- Supabase URL and anon key available
- Auth endpoints accessible
What is User Enumeration?
User enumeration occurs when an application reveals whether a user account exists through:
| Vector | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Different error messages | "User not found" vs "Wrong password" |
| Response timing | Fast for non-existent, slow for existing |
| Response codes | 404 vs 401 |
| Signup response | "Email already registered" |
Why It Matters
| Risk | Impact |
|---|---|
| Targeted attacks | Attackers know valid accounts |
| Phishing | Confirm targets have accounts |
| Credential stuffing | Reduce attack scope |
| Privacy | Reveal user presence |
Tests Performed
| Endpoint | Test Method |
|---|---|
/auth/v1/signup |
Try registering existing email |
/auth/v1/token |
Try login with various emails |
/auth/v1/recover |
Try password reset |
/auth/v1/otp |
Try OTP for various emails |
Usage
Basic Enumeration Test
Test for user enumeration vulnerabilities
Test Specific Endpoint
Test login endpoint for user enumeration
Output Format
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
USER ENUMERATION AUDIT
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Project: abc123def.supabase.co
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Signup Endpoint (/auth/v1/signup)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST with known existing email
Response for existing: "User already registered"
Response for new email: User object returned
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE
The response clearly indicates if an email is registered.
Exploitation:
```bash
curl -X POST https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/signup \
-H "apikey: [anon-key]" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email": "target@example.com", "password": "test123"}'
# If user exists: {"msg": "User already registered"}
# If new user: User created or confirmation needed
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ Login Endpoint (/auth/v1/token) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST with different email scenarios
Existing email, wrong password: βββ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"} βββ Time: 245ms βββ Code: 400
Non-existing email: βββ Response: {"error": "Invalid login credentials"} βββ Time: 52ms β Significantly faster! βββ Code: 400
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Although the error message is the same, the response time is noticeably different: βββ Existing user: ~200-300ms (password hashing) βββ Non-existing: ~50-100ms (no hash check)
Timing Attack PoC:
import requests
import time
def check_user(email):
start = time.time()
requests.post(
'https://abc123def.supabase.co/auth/v1/token',
params={'grant_type': 'password'},
json={'email': email, 'password': 'wrong'},
headers={'apikey': '[anon-key]'}
)
elapsed = time.time() - start
return elapsed > 0.15 # Threshold
exists = check_user('target@example.com')
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ Password Recovery (/auth/v1/recover) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: POST recovery request for different emails
Existing email: βββ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"} βββ Time: 1250ms (email actually sent) βββ Code: 200
Non-existing email: βββ Response: {"message": "Password recovery email sent"} βββ Time: 85ms β Much faster (no email sent) βββ Code: 200
Status: π P2 - ENUMERABLE VIA TIMING
Same message, but timing reveals existence. Existing users trigger actual email sending (~1s+).
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ Magic Link / OTP (/auth/v1/otp) βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Test: Request OTP for different emails
Existing email: βββ Response: {"message": "OTP sent"} βββ Time: 1180ms βββ Code: 200
Non-existing email: βββ Response: {"error": "User not found"} βββ Time: 95ms βββ Code: 400
Status: π΄ P1 - DIRECTLY ENUMERABLE
The error message explicitly states user doesn't exist.
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ Summary βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
Endpoints Tested: 4 Enumerable: 4 (100%)
Vulnerability Severity: βββ π΄ P1: OTP endpoint (explicit message) βββ π P2: Signup endpoint (explicit message) βββ π P2: Login endpoint (timing attack) βββ π P2: Recovery endpoint (timing attack)
Overall User Enumeration Risk: HIGH
An attacker can determine if any email address has an account in your application.
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ Mitigation Recommendations βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
-
CONSISTENT RESPONSES Return identical messages for all scenarios: "If an account exists, you will receive an email"
-
CONSISTENT TIMING Add artificial delay to normalize response times:
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1000; // 1 second const start = Date.now(); // ... perform auth operation ... const elapsed = Date.now() - start; await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed) )); return response; -
RATE LIMITING Already enabled: 3/hour per IP Consider per-email rate limiting too.
-
CAPTCHA Add CAPTCHA for repeated attempts:
- After 3 failed logins
- For password recovery
- For signup
-
MONITORING Alert on enumeration patterns:
- Many requests with different emails
- Sequential email patterns (user1@, user2@, ...)
βββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββββ
## Timing Analysis
The skill measures response times to detect timing-based enumeration:
Existing user: βββ Password hash verification: ~200-300ms βββ Email sending: ~1000-2000ms βββ Database lookup: ~5-20ms
Non-existing user: βββ No hash verification: 0ms βββ No email sending: 0ms βββ Database lookup: ~5-20ms (not found)
Threshold detection:
- Difference > 100ms: Possible timing leak
- Difference > 500ms: Definite timing leak
## Context Output
```json
{
"user_enumeration": {
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T13:30:00Z",
"endpoints_tested": 4,
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
"severity": "P1",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "OTP sent",
"missing_response": "User not found"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/signup",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "explicit_message",
"existing_response": "User already registered",
"missing_response": "User created"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",
"existing_time_ms": 245,
"missing_time_ms": 52
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/recover",
"severity": "P2",
"type": "timing_attack",
"existing_time_ms": 1250,
"missing_time_ms": 85
}
]
}
}
Mitigation Code Examples
Consistent Response Time
// Edge Function with normalized timing
const MIN_RESPONSE_TIME = 1500; // 1.5 seconds
Deno.serve(async (req) => {
const start = Date.now();
try {
// Perform actual auth operation
const result = await handleAuth(req);
// Normalize response time
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
));
return new Response(JSON.stringify(result));
} catch (error) {
// Same timing for errors
const elapsed = Date.now() - start;
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r,
Math.max(0, MIN_RESPONSE_TIME - elapsed)
));
// Generic error message
return new Response(JSON.stringify({
message: "Check your email if you have an account"
}));
}
});
Generic Error Messages
// Don't reveal user existence
async function requestPasswordReset(email: string) {
// Always return success message
const response = {
message: "If an account with that email exists, " +
"you will receive a password reset link."
};
// Perform actual reset in background (don't await)
supabase.auth.resetPasswordForEmail(email).catch(() => {});
return response;
}
MANDATORY: Progressive Context File Updates
β οΈ This skill MUST update tracking files PROGRESSIVELY during execution, NOT just at the end.
Critical Rule: Write As You Go
DO NOT batch all writes at the end. Instead:
- Before testing each endpoint β Log the action to
.sb-pentest-audit.log - After each timing measurement β Immediately update
.sb-pentest-context.json - After each enumeration vector found β Log the finding immediately
This ensures that if the skill is interrupted, crashes, or times out, all findings up to that point are preserved.
Required Actions (Progressive)
-
Update
.sb-pentest-context.jsonwith results:{ "user_enumeration": { "timestamp": "...", "endpoints_tested": 4, "vulnerabilities": [ ... ] } } -
Log to
.sb-pentest-audit.log:[TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [START] Testing user enumeration [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [FINDING] P1: OTP endpoint enumerable [TIMESTAMP] [supabase-audit-auth-users] [CONTEXT_UPDATED] .sb-pentest-context.json updated -
If files don't exist, create them before writing.
FAILURE TO UPDATE CONTEXT FILES IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.
MANDATORY: Evidence Collection
π Evidence Directory: .sb-pentest-evidence/05-auth-audit/enumeration-tests/
Evidence Files to Create
| File | Content |
|---|---|
enumeration-tests/login-timing.json |
Login endpoint timing analysis |
enumeration-tests/recovery-timing.json |
Recovery endpoint timing |
enumeration-tests/otp-enumeration.json |
OTP endpoint message analysis |
Evidence Format
{
"evidence_id": "AUTH-ENUM-001",
"timestamp": "2025-01-31T11:00:00Z",
"category": "auth-audit",
"type": "user_enumeration",
"tests": [
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/token",
"test_type": "timing_attack",
"severity": "P2",
"existing_user_test": {
"email": "[KNOWN_EXISTING]@example.com",
"response_time_ms": 245,
"response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
},
"nonexisting_user_test": {
"email": "definitely-not-exists@example.com",
"response_time_ms": 52,
"response": {"error": "Invalid login credentials"}
},
"timing_difference_ms": 193,
"result": "ENUMERABLE",
"impact": "Can determine if email has account via timing"
},
{
"endpoint": "/auth/v1/otp",
"test_type": "explicit_message",
"severity": "P1",
"existing_user_response": {"message": "OTP sent"},
"nonexisting_user_response": {"error": "User not found"},
"result": "ENUMERABLE",
"impact": "Error message explicitly reveals user existence"
}
],
"curl_commands": [
"# Timing test - existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"existing@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'",
"# Timing test - non-existing user\ntime curl -X POST '$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password' -H 'apikey: $ANON_KEY' -d '{\"email\": \"nonexistent@example.com\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}'"
]
}
Related Skills
supabase-audit-auth-configβ Full auth configurationsupabase-audit-auth-signupβ Signup flow testingsupabase-reportβ Include in final report
Use this skill
Connect your agent to the Skill Store MCP server and ask for it by ref: yoanbernabeu/supabase-audit-auth-users-73840051983.
Details
- Publisher
- yoanbernabeu
- Category
- Security βΊ Application security
- License
- MIT
- Updated
- 2026-01-31
References
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